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Abstract: The rise of social protection into the limelight of social policy has opened up space for
understanding how it can act as a key interface between states and citizens. This paper rethinks social
protection through the lens of citizenship. It considers how the design and implementation of social
protection can be shifted away from discretionary and technocratic forms, to forms which stimulate
vulnerable citizens to make justice-based claims for their rights and demand accountability for the
realisation of those rights. It puts forward a conceptual framework for social protection with three
modalities through which citizens can be engaged: as shapers and makers; as users and choosers;
and as passive consumers.    
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1. INTRODUCTION
Social protection as the handmaiden of household resilience and economic growth sits firmly and
squarely in the current development limelight. After 15 years of designing, evaluating and targeting,
social transfers (cash, food and assets) and the institutional set up that supports their delivery
(increasingly linked to a range of livelihood support) constitute the core of social protection
provision (Barrientos and Hulme, 2008; Bastagli et al. 2016; Devereux and SabatesWheeler, 2015).
In this phenomenal rise of social protection, scant attention has been paid to the terms of economic
and political inclusion for the most vulnerable. Except for a few examples (some presented as case
studies later in this paper), most social protection provisions, particularly in low-income and
aid-dependent countries, remain income-focused, discretionary, and conditioned, by definition.
Under these terms of provision, households feel lucky to be the chosen ones and labels of the
‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor radically shape the current normative landscape for social provision. 
The purpose of this paper is to consider how social protection can be provided and accessed in
ways that genuinely seek to address vulnerability and uphold the just and sustained provision of
basic social rights to all. Within this context, understanding how social protection can be designed
and grounded as a rights-based notion of social justice becomes critical. Rights provide a
framework for social protection, through enshrining the State as a ‘duty-bearer,’ obliged to ensure
that these entitlements are provided. Social protection can be designed to reciprocate this duty by
providing a means for the poor to participate in society, economically, politically and socially
(Ulriksen and Plagerson, 2014). If designed with care, social protection interventions can have
intrinsic as well as instrumental benefits for States and citizens. The relationship between States,
social protection and citizens is thus another key concept which this paper seeks to explore. 
Assessing how social protection can be designed to move towards intrinsic impacts (such as
inclusive social norms and good governance) requires multiple levels of analysis. To address this,
the paper is structured as follows: The next section describes the rise of social protection in many
aid-dependent countries and details how it has frequently been designed as a productivist,
conditioned and compensatory-based service model. The paper then considers some of the ways in
which the state is able to reify intrinsic rights and justice-based notions of social protection. 
The following section approaches the issues from the citizen side, by exploring how justice-based
social protection can enable and support the poor and vulnerable to make claims on social protection
provision. It reviews how the implementation of social protection programmes can achieve an
interface of closed, invited and/or claimed spaces to encourage and support participation and
empowerment of the poor and vulnerable. We develop a conceptual framework showing three central
ways in which citizenship can be asserted through such spaces. This framework is used to examine
how, and the extent to which, the design and delivery of rights-based social protection frameworks
in India, Brazil and Ghana enable vulnerable populations to actively assert their citizenship.  
We show that the way that the justice-based system has emerged varies from country to country.
The case of India illustrates an active and vocal citizenry requiring the State to meet its
responsibilities; in Brazil the legal and policy machinery enabled experimentation at the local level,
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a subsequent groundswell of support for social and economic guarantees and a consequent
pressure on the State not to relinquish its responsibilities. The end result in the case of both India
and Brazil is a justice-based system, where citizens can, when necessary, insist that the State deliver
legally constituted rights. In Ghana (a case illustrating higher dependence on aid provision),
justice-based provision is in its infancy. Despite this there is political commitment supported by
practical intermediary-facilitated support that has set Ghana on a path to promoting active
citizenship in the context of social protection provision. In the final section of the paper, we offer
conclusions based on our findings.
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2. THE NEED FOR JUSTICE-BASED CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION
2.1 The rise of ‘productivist’ models of social protection
Over the last 15 years political support for social protection strategies have grown rapidly, with
numerous multilateral organizations and Governments adopting five- to ten-year plans, reflecting
political commitment and the shift of social protection into the limelight of development policy.1
The most cited and studied form of social protection – cash transfers - have been piloted and scaled
up in many countries across the globe.2
In recognition of the fact (some 10-12 years ago) that year-on-year emergency appeals and emergency
responses, particularly in Africa, were doing little to tackle chronic poverty, and at worse, were
targeting exactly the same households every year, social protection raised high hopes for pro- poor
growth and anti-poverty programming, as a novel agenda and a means of moving the chronically
poor and vulnerable out of continual dependency. The Latin American social protection story has a
different history, yet nonetheless it emerged largely due to pressure to address a combination of
excessive income inequality and very high poverty rates (Lustig, 2010; Lustig et al. 2013).
With their genesis rooted in the large and popular Latin American conditional cash transfer
programmes – linking cash payments to behaviour change around education and health care
uptake – many social transfer programmes were transported to Africa and Asia. These programmes
were predicated on the assumption that conditions are required to ensure the poor utilize their
resources in a socially optimal way– and in a way that increases their own chances of moving out of
poverty. These conditions, which found their ultimate worth in State-reciprocated supply of schools
and health centres, were not able to find traction in many sub-Saharan African settings where the
facilities needed to enable conditions were inadequate, and often non-existent (Schubert and Slater,
2006). These supply constraints, along with critiques of ‘immoral’ paternalism (Freeland, 2007)
meant that conditions attached to social transfers quickly fell away in many lower-income countries. 
The landscape of social transfers in Africa and Asia is primarily one of unconditional cash transfers
(Davis, Gaarder, Handa, and Yablonski, 2012). Despite this move to condition-free transfers, other
forms of ‘conditionality’ (particularly in the form of qualification conditions) remained an inherent
part of the social protection design and delivery mechanisms, whether in the form of work
requirements, food security status, vulnerable group status or some other targeting proxy.
This ensured that social protection remained compensatory and contingent, often viewed as a gift
or a handout to a sub-section of the poorest and most vulnerable. The fact that cash transfers often
target women who provide childcare, and elderly or disabled people, further embeds the implicit
framing of social protection as charity or kindness (Ferguson, 2015). The more unsavoury and
increasingly frequent terminology that has emerged to embed this discretion-based provision
categorizes the poor as ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’ (Sepúlveda Carmona, 2014). 
Even now, it is clear that the majority of social protection provision in low-income aid-dependent
countries sits squarely within the top-down, compensatory-based provision agenda, which
1 Examples of these include the WB (2012); UNICEF (2012); EU (2012).
2 See Bastagli et al. (2016).
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relegates vulnerable citizens to consumers of these discretionary handouts. This is also the case in
some middle-income countries. What we term here as ‘conditions-for-growth’ models of social
protection refers to the vast plethora of social protection initiatives, including all forms of transfers
for poor and vulnerable households, which condition provision of all manner of poverty proxies,
targeting and behavioural change. The ‘conditions’ are applied both explicitly and implicitly, based
on an erroneous theory of progressive economic inclusion for the deserving few; one has to look
no further than the numerous graduation model programmes for evidence of this. 
This theory is erroneous: While the conceptualization of social protection recognizes citizens as
rightful owners of national wealth and cash transfers as mechanisms of redistribution, what we
witness in social protection practice is largely a neo-liberal agenda for the global south that
transfers the onus of responsibility for welfare provision and social minimums from the State to the
citizen. Of course, this is not always the case and we provide examples from India and Brazil in this
paper to illustrate an alternative trajectory. 
Furthermore, as rights-based programming becomes more common in aid-dependent countries,
States are increasingly taking on their duty bearing responsibilities (see the case of Ghana discussed
later in this paper). In other words, the conditionality for growth has been individualized and laid at
the feet of poor and vulnerable households, in the name of empowerment and participation. We see
this in the explicit conditions for education and health uptake, or in the asset, training and
entrepreneurial start-up advice given to beneficiaries of graduation programmes.3 On the one hand,
households are expected – with a little hand holding from States and donors – to ‘grow themselves
out of poverty’. On the other hand, the State and donors abdicate any responsibility for providing
conditions conducive to supporting household growth out of poverty, such as platforms that build the
agency and structures needed to escape vulnerability (for example, adequate quality labour markets
or education). Many social protection programmes set targets for the numbers of households to be
graduated, yet evaluation work from a number of programmes shows that households are ‘exited’
even without the minimum thresholds for well-being and productive inclusion being met
(for instance, see Berhane, Gilligan, Hoddinott et al. (2014); and Hoddinott et al. (2013), for the case of
the PSNP; and Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2017), for an example from Rwanda).
Questions remain: Why is there such limited emphasis on conditions applied to States to ensure the
graduation of the poor and vulnerable? Where do the duties of the State towards its citizens lie?
How can we move from discretionary-based social protection to justice and rights-based notions? 
2.2 The role of institutions and actors in embedding justice-based social protection
frameworks within laws and policy
The exact scope of ‘social protection’ is a question of debate. A widely used starting point is
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2007) definition of social protection as “all public and private
initiatives that provide income or consumption transfers to the poor, protect the vulnerable against
livelihood risks, and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised; with the overall
3 With graduation, we mean exiting a social protection programme after a beneficiary has reached a certain wellbeing
threshold or has acquired a set of resources (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2015).
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objective of reducing the economic and social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and marginalised
groups.” This definition encompasses the usual elements of social protection – non-contributory,
social assistance measures, such as food and cash transfers, as well as contributory social
insurance measures, such as pensions and occupation-based provision. 
When viewed through the lens of states and citizens, social protection sees citizens as rightful
owners of State wealth and social protection as a mechanism for the distribution of resources.
The nature of the resource, and who has the right of access to it, defines the possibilities for justice
and redistribution (Newell and Wheeler, 2006). Moreover, “while the deprivation of a resource may
be predominantly economic in character, gaining the right to access resources and the right to
claim accountability is a political project, with citizenship at its core” (Newell and Wheeler, 2006,
p.8). Framed as a rights-based struggle for the just distribution for resources, the remit of social
protection is thus extended to include transformational objectives of economic, social and
political empowerment. In other words, this definition e implicitly shifts the focus of
patronage/discretionary-based (in the case of assistance) and status-based (in the case of labour
market position) welfare access and provision to one where rights and justice become central to
transforming economic opportunities. This explains why Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2008)
frame social protection as having the potential to be a ‘currency of social justice’. 
Despite this progressive framing, this transformative approach does not interrogate the source of
legitimacy for social protection provision and associated institutions. In fact, very little literature
within the social protection global library has done this. The majority of literature takes social
protection as a technocratic, top-down solution to risk and vulnerability, particularly for the poorest.
For the most part, social protection is seen as instrumental to achieving productivist goals.4
The goals of social policy in the south tend to be “remedial, individualistic rather than collective,
targeted more often than universal, and frequently imposed top down or from the outside”
(Walker, 2013, p. 273). These goals frequently reflect donor agendas and external pressure to reform
social provision delivery systems.
In fact, external influence on social protection is common in many countries that are working to
develop social protection systems, particularly in lower-income countries where a significant
portion of the funding for implementation comes from international donors. This top-down
approach affects the objectives and motivations of delivery on the part of hosting States, but may
also serve as the catalyst for the establishment of justice-based social protection. Sometimes
social protection programmes start as small pilots, often solely with donor funding (such as in
Malawi and Zambia), which grow to become national programmes as political support and
government funding increase. Continued donor presence has the potential to influence the shift
towards justice-based social protection, prioritizing the building of accountability mechanisms –
such as complaints and grievances mechanisms - or case management; building the agency of citizens
4 Examples of this are the introduction of universal health care insurance by Taiwan and South Korea in the mid-1990s;
or the more recent mushrooming of productive safety nets and graduation models. Social policy over the last 20+ years
has served as a handmaiden of economic growth. In the 1990’s this was rapid industrialization; nowadays as we see a
slowdown in economic growth the political justification for social protection is less obvious.
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to demand access to social protection and regularizing programme delivery. Such operational
revisions help to make social protection more reliable and dependable for citizens, with an
opportunity to strengthen the social contract.
Conversely, however, such external influence may disrupt the contribution of the programme into
building a social contract between the State and its citizens. First, external support often comes in
the form of both financial and technical support for the design of a relevant cash programme.
This undermines the opportunity to include citizens in the design phase of social protection and
often limits input from government. Citizen’s participation may be considered as an afterthought
and provided in a ‘tokenistic’ manner through inclusion of some form of community committee or
representation. For example, the Hunger Safety Net Programme in Kenya is only now looking
seriously into social accountability - some six years after the launch of the programme. Second,
the objectives of the donors and the State can differ greatly, as donors bring their own ethical
perspectives and may emphasize different priorities than the government (e.g. poverty alleviation
vs. economic growth). Finally, heavy donor engagement in programme design, implementation and
monitoring may result in citizens associating a programme with a specific donor, rather than with
the government, further perpetuating the notion that cash transfers are a handout rather than a
right, and that the support is temporary and can be withdrawn at any time. This view discourages
holding the State accountable as it is not seen to be a part of the process.
Regardless of the degree of donor influence, there is strong potential to transition programmes
from donor-funded pilot projects towards State-provided social rights. Embedding social protection
into policy and legislation is a crucial first step towards solidifying the State’s responsibility, often
taken once a programme has been scaled-up to become a national programme. This conversion
takes place not only in terms of an increased share of government financial responsibility, but also
with the building in of increased accountability in mind, together with agency elements such as
case management, complaints and grievances and improved communication strategies. The case
study of the LEAP cash transfer programme in Ghana (see Section 5 of this paper) is an example
of a government that is currently making this shift.
Recent work by Barrientos (2013b, 2016), Hickey (2014) and others, on political conceptions of justice,
question the standard efficiency and effectiveness arguments as the sole justification for the
expansion of social protection. Barrientos claims that the justification for social protection provision
requires a normative basis, and as such he develops a Rawlsian argument for justice-based social
assistance. Rawls (2001) posits that social assistance should be grounded on social justice,
understood as the principles enabling and regulating social and economic cooperation. Counteracting
the negative aspects and outcomes of inequality are central to his notion of justice, whereby a
progressively instituted social minimum is required to uphold the basis for cooperation between all
members of society. Social justice concerns the very structure and institutions of society – political,
economic and legal. Inclusion of the most disadvantaged into these structures is a core element of
system legitimacy, providing the legitimacy for, and ensuring the sustainability of social assistance.
Legally, social justice is relational to institutions which are obligated to dispense justice for the
smooth running of society, the allocation of resources, and the negotiation of rights and obligations.
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Access to justice signifies that citizens are able to use legal instruments in order to ensure that
rights are recognized and granted. The concept of law and justice is therefore inextricably linked to
rights. Against this backdrop, the framing of social protection as legislation is crucial in assisting
citizens or civil society organisations who assist citizens to claim their rights. The case study of
MGNREGA (see Section 4.1) explains this concept in more detail. Establishment of a legal basis for
social protection also helps sustain social protection programmes, reducing the likelihood that they
will be used for political favour rather than for the intended provision of long-term social rights.
Thus, when there is a political party transition, the programme continues, reducing the risk of
replacement by the new administration. This can be seen clearly in the Bolsa Família case,
described later in this paper.
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3. ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP AND RIGHTS-BASED SOCIAL PROTECTION
3.1 Embedding justice-based social protection frameworks within laws and constitution
An important feature of a justice-based approach to social protection relates to the existence of a
framework that contributes to a predictability and transparency of benefits. Legal and institutional
frameworks play an integral role in ensuring that beneficiaries can demand their entitlements
and protest violations of their rights (Sepúlveda Carmona and Nyst, 2012). In the absence of a
well-established legal framework, programmes are more vulnerable to political manipulation and
the long-term involvement of State authorities in all stages of the programme cannot be
guaranteed. In other words, if social protection programmes and interventions are not anchored in
law, there are higher risks that the programme will not be sustainable and may terminate with a
change of government. A justice-based system of social protection thus requires that the right to
social security be “enshrined in the Constitution” (Sepúlveda Carmona and Nyst, 2012, p. 29).
In framing their Constitutions, States iterate their legal obligations to their citizens, often committing
to the protection of a basic standard of living for all citizens (i.e. the right to social protection). 
In outlining how agencies can enable collective citizen action, Joshi and Moore highlight ‘rights’ as
critical. They define rights as “the extent to which (a) the benefits received under external
programmes are recognised as moral or – better – legal entitlements, and (b) there are recognized
(preferably legal) mechanisms that the beneficiaries can access to ensure that these entitlements
are actually realised” (Joshi and Moore, 2000, p. 7). In addition, as the International Labour
Organization (ILO) argues, constitutional provisions are often inadequate unless they are
accompanied by “detailed national legislation … that determines the design, administration,
management, delivery, financing and monitoring arrangements of the entitlements provided by
the social security system” (ILO, 2012, p. 31).
However the good intentions of Constitutions are often challenging to translate into practice and
are more robust when grounded in policy and legislation. Therefore, while a constitutional article
may iterate provision of State public assistance to the needy or protection of the livelihoods of the
vulnerable, the right is only truly realized upon the actual enactment of a policy or legal guarantee
of social assistance to all citizens. One example is the consistent and increasing trend in
sub-Saharan African countries of establishing social protection policies and drafting social
protection bills as a means of institutionalizing successful pilot social protection interventions.
A lens of justice-based provision requires that we consider how social protection interventions and
systems mediate and contribute to changes in the role of government and social structures that uphold
the social minimums for the most disadvantaged. On the one hand, we need to consider the role of the
legal and political government machinery to cooperate with and care for its most disadvantaged
citizens as a way of building active citizenship. On the other hand, how can strong active citizenship
build a more justice-based social protection approach, reflecting the duty of the State? 
The section below lays out this second dimension of the State-citizen interface in relation to social
protection. We explore how citizens can affect social protection policies and the conditions that
allow citizens to engage in shaping and monitoring the implementation of these polices. 
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3.2 Active citizenship and rights-based social protection
Citizenship can be viewed as an axis which links more inclusive and accountable programmes with
improved service delivery. In the social policy domain, citizenship has traditionally been
conceptualized and expressed in three broad ways:
I) AS SOCIAL RIGHTS
The first idea of social rights builds upon T.H. Marshall’s seminal work on Citizenship and
Social Class (1950), which argues that rights stretch beyond the civil and political, to include
social rights as part of a national resource base, which can provide economic security, health
and education (ibid). While this definition of citizenship is useful in terms of framing
citizenship as a justice-based entitlement to sharing of the resources of a nation, it is limited
by the static nature in which citizens are posited as beneficiaries or consumers who cast
votes in exchange for these resources. This notion has also been challenged on the grounds
that the realities of power and inequalities “make some citizens more equal than others”
(Cornwall and Gaventa, 2001, p. 7). 
II) AS A FORM OF AGENCY
The second notion of citizenship as ‘agency’ conceptualises citizenship as an enabling force,
which encourages citizens to act and participate in political, economic and social
decision-making as a fundamental right. This actor-oriented notion of citizenship is built on a
civic engagement premise, where citizens and States must collaborate and coordinate to achieve
otherwise unattainable outcomes by being active ‘users and choosers’ of State services. 
III) AS SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
A third notion of citizenship builds on the idea of agency, but conceptualizes the relationship
of accountability between citizens and the State, as the core of citizenship. This notion of
citizenship is asserted and accrued when recipients of State services view themselves as
actors and ‘shapers’, not passive beneficiaries, who have not only the right but also the
responsibility to hold the State accountable. This form of citizenship is a shift away from
passive right holders and users of services, towards an active form of citizenship where
citizens have a responsibility to engage in social policy. We draw on Cornwall and Gaventa by
conceptualizing this form of citizenship as ‘shapers and makers’ (2001). 
The second and third dimensions of citizenship reflect a more dynamic relationship between the
State and its citizens which Evan’s defines as ‘State-society synergies’ (Evans, 1997). To achieve such
synergies, institutions must be inclusive and have interfaces and spaces created (or claimed) to
facilitate this. The extension of citizenship from a right or enabling force to a role of responsibility,
also shifts the ground for social policy: If citizens have a responsibility to hold the State
accountable, the State also a responsibility to be transparent and facilitate this engagement. 
As outlined in Figure 1, this intrinsic relationship between active citizens and effective States is a
complex and evolving one - with multiple benefits which are instrumental in the short-term and
more intrinsic in the long-term. Figure 1 illustrates how citizens’ capabilities are often built up by
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State programmes or policies, (health, education and information) while State institutions are
similarly constructed - shaped and refined through the actions of citizens, thus empowered. 
Figure 1 - Instrumental and intrinsic benefits of social protection
Potential
States           Social Protection Interface Citizens
Impacts
Instrumental Improved service delivery Provision of information Income-based cash transfer
and reduced corruption Codes of conduct Organization and
Responsive duty bearers Grievance procedures social cohesion
Improved policy design Empowered citizens
Good governance
Citizen’s charters
Inclusive social norms
Intrinsic Social audits
Trust and confidence
Source: Adapted from Joshi (forthcoming) 
Instrumental benefits serve immediate basic needs and service provision, such as consumption
security, provision of health and education services. The intrinsic benefits of citizen participation
have their origins in Rousseau’s social contract concept, which argues that participation allows
citizens to develop a civic consciousness, build civil society coalitions and political capabilities,
as well as taking the public interest into account. Both instrumental and intrinsic benefits are
important. Social protection programmes designed around citizens being shapers and makers or
even users and choosers, therefore, have the potential to build social contracts which include
increased trust and confidence, whether implicit or explicit, between States and citizens.
By identifying areas where the government is seeking information generated by citizens, it may
be possible to start in a non-confrontational process of building State-citizen linkages
(McCluskey, 2016) and social contracts within social protection programmes to strengthen
the credibility of government among citizens. 
In summary, when viewed through the lens of citizenship, social protection programmes can be
seen in three distinct ways: 
• As conditioned and discretionary services, where citizens are framed as consumers.
For instance, many small short-term NGO cash transfer projects would fit this description.
• As technical fixes which engage with citizens as users and choosers, who use grievances
mechanisms or public information to ensure better delivery of social protection programmes.
For instance, as programmes evolve from small pilot projects programme implementers
frequently build in mechanisms to increase transparency and accountability (the case of
Ghana described in this paper illustrates this).
• As social policies and institutions that foster demand-driven governance and engage citizens
as “active agents in the making and shaping of policies” (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2001, p. 1) at
the design phases enabling citizens to claim their rights and open up spaces to hold the State
accountable for implementation (for instance, where the sustainability of the programme is
determined by potential clients (citizens), such as in the case of NREGA and Bolsa Família,
discussed in Section 4).
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3.3 From consumers to shapers: repositioning citizens in social protection
The discourse surrounding rights-based social protection has primarily focused on the higher-level
design phase of establishing the policy and legislative frameworks. These legislative frameworks
are spaces where forms of citizenship agency can be expressed by identifying the government or
service providers as the ‘duty-bearer’ and the citizens as the ‘rights-holder’. Although these
definitions are clarified at the political level, at the grassroots delivery-level these rights are not
always known, understood, or demanded by the marginalized citizens who are those most in need
of these services. To allow poor citizens to claim their rights, and assert their citizenship,
programmes and policies need to be strategically designed with ‘inclusive spaces’ for citizen
participation at the design phase, and to allow duty bearers to receive feedback at the delivery
phases. In light of a recent study which illustrates how programme participants perceive their cash
payments as a ‘gift’ that they are ‘lucky’ to receive, the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer (HSCT) in
Zimbabwe is investigating ways to sensitize the programme participants to a broader
understanding of their rights (Sabates-Wheeler et al. forthcoming 2017). Part of this inclusive space
is the presence of a robust communication strategy within the design of the programme,
institutionalizing a citizen-based approach that informs citizens of their rights, entitlements and
increases dialogue, consultation and the airing of grievances and/or lodging of appeals. 
The second and third notions of citizenship as “users and choosers” and “shapers and makers”
actively establish citizenship as an axis between citizens and the State. Social protection interfaces
can be critical in enabling vulnerable populations to claim their rights and assert their citizenship
(along with political, economic and social lines). Both a bottom-up and top-down construct,
citizenship models are significantly shaped by social policy and formal institutions. Such policies,
and their institutional manifestations, mediate between citizens and the State, defining the
dominant paradigm for the allocation of political, social and economic resources (Shani, 2010).
Active citizenship, is thus present when citizens “negotiate the terms of their access to mandated
public goods and services in ways that are publicly sanctioned and protected” (Houtzager and
Acharya, 2011, p. 3). Social protection alone is clearly not a panacea for all good things. Yet, if
designed sensibly, it can help increase participation, build citizenship and perhaps build momentum
to enable otherwise voiceless and vulnerable populations to hold the State accountable for the right
to protect them (as demonstrated in the case studies from India, Brazil and Ghana).
Viewing citizens as active agents and opening up inclusive spaces to link citizens to the State
through rights and obligations, is crucial for enabling instrumental service-delivery and intrinsic
level citizenship benefits. The key is designing mechanisms which allow active citizens to improve
the quality of services and strengthen their civic or political rights through participation and
collective action. The symbiotic relationship between the State and citizens ‘shapers and makers’ is
crucial in making this happen. While vulnerable citizens might not have the organisational
capabilities and established trade unions they often have strong advocates within elite circles and
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co-coalitions with activists who are part of the policy bargaining process and advocate on their
behalf or with them using moral and ethical arguments. This is outlined further in the MGNREGA
example in India.5
3.4. Citizenship, Social Accountability, and Social Protection: A Conceptual Framework
The burgeoning field of social accountability holds many lessons for promoting active citizenship.
‘Social accountability’ is an umbrella term for mechanisms that seek to operationalize direct
accountability relationships between citizens and the State (Malena, Forster and Singh, 2004).
These mechanisms allow citizens to participate in the provision of services by giving them a
“direct stake in the quantity and quality of public services available to them” (Pandey et al. 2011).
Synergies between the rapidly expanding field of social accountability and the delivery of social
protection programmes are evident in terms of the target populations of these fields: both target
marginalized or vulnerable citizens and could be linked together at the policy and implementation
level, to maximize efforts of reducing poverty and vulnerability (FAO and IDS, 2016). 
As a sector, social protection has seen less focus on governance, accountability and rights than
other sectors such as health and education. As social protection grows, so too does the need for
evidence on how to move towards improved intrinsic impacts for the poorest and most vulnerable.
As discussed in Figure 1, a social protection programme that is organized around achieving intrinsic
benefits can improve trust and confidence in the State, building a two-way social contract with
citizens. However, social protection that delivers more instrumental benefits may still play a role
and begin building the intrinsic foundation for a social contract. The degree to which social
protection can contribute to this social contract is dependent upon many factors. In this framework
we focus on how social accountability mechanisms within the design of social protection
programmes can establish interfaces between the State and its citizens. 
The concept of interfaces is at the heart of literature on participation and social accountability
literature – without interfaces/spaces to engage, it is hard to assert one’s citizenship. Social protection
creates these ‘physical spaces’ between citizens and the State allowing engagement and mediation of
citizen-State relations. In this sense, social protection can strengthen or foster a social contract by
allowing citizens to assert their citizenship and oblige the State to fulfill its duties. These interfaces can
vary in the degree of support for active citizenship. Power relations which surround these interfaces
are the key mediating variable within them. Gaventa’s work reminds us of three spaces of power:
closed spaces entail barriers to participation; invited spaces widen participation; and claimed spaces
in which social movements create organic areas for participation (Gaventa, 2006).
Figure 2 (page 18) illustrates that the spectrum in which citizen engagement can fall, depending on
the subsequent interface embedded in the social protection design. On the far left, the delivery of
social protection is more instrumental and technocratic, with programmes delivered in a top-down
manner to citizens who are passive ‘consumers’ of social protection. This closed space has no entry
5 Engaged citizens help expand ‘social’ aspects of social protection: rights, social justice, empowerment. Social protection,
if well designed, can open up spaces for a dialogue between citizens and the State. This can build citizenship, strengthen
their voice and start a process of empowerment (a first step).
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points for citizens to engage in the design, targeting or implementation of the programme and there
are no mechanisms to voice concerns, with decisions undertaken by a group of policy elite. While
the consumer of social protection has little agency or power, there is still an element of social
contract being built in that the State is holding up its duty bearer obligation in delivery of social
protection through closed spaces. 
In the centre of the diagram, we find programmes that are shifting towards justice-based social
protection. Here invited spaces engage citizens as ‘users and choosers’, once implementation is
underway this allows citizens to be active users who monitor and assert their citizenship through
social accountability mechanisms such as grievance mechanisms or social audits. Examples are
civil society platforms or broad consultations in the context of the preparation of a new law or
policy or robust monitoring systems that collect the opinions and experiences of beneficiaries and
feed such information into programme and policy revisions. Through this interface of social
protection, citizens can voice their concerns through invited spaces, leading to more responsive
engagement on the part of public officials, and reducing corruption.
Figure 2 - How social accountability mechanisms enable citizen-State interfaces within social
protection programmes
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At the right end of the spectrum citizens are actively engaged as ‘makers and shapers’ to participate
in the design, implementation and revision of social protection programmes. Makers and shapers
do this through organic claimed spaces, forged by mobilized citizens who share a set of common
concerns or identity. Many citizen accountability initiatives that emerge involve creating claimed
spaces for public deliberation about accountability failures – for example social audits which were
the result of civil society-led public hearings on the implementation of public programmes
(Grandvoinnet, Aslam, and Raha, 2015). In addition, there are citizens’ groups which openly discuss
the programme at the community level and provide feedback through representatives at various
levels to improve upon programme design and/or delivery. This two-way interaction has the
potential to enable better policy design and governance, as well as to empower citizens and build
trust and legitimacy around the social contract. Makers and shapers can also utilize the same
invited spaces mentioned above to raise grievances or complaints. 
The interface between State and citizens, in the form of social protection, has the potential to fulfil
citizens’ rights to social protection and builds capabilities and agency of marginalized citizens to
claim their rights, assert their citizenship, and hold allow duty bearers accountable. The framework
showcases the central role of the State in establishing a formal obligation towards provision of
justice-based social protection and subsequent design of programmes that enables this participation.
As discussed previously, intermediaries may be influential and even pivotal in facilitating the
interfaces and setting up the ‘social protection hardware’, but in the final analysis, the State must be
central to the accountability relationship. It is important to note that this engagement is not
restrictive, but resides on a spectrum with differing levels of citizen engagement, possible across
the spectrum. The design of social protection within a country determines the degree of
participation that is allowed. In the next sections we will see how this can vary across content by
presenting three country case studies: India, Brazil and Ghana.
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4. THE ROLE OF THE STATE AND ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP IN THE MAKING AND SHAPING
OF SOCIAL PROTECTION: CASE STUDIES
4.1. MGNREGA 
Launched in February 2006 and extended to all districts in 2008, the National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act (later renamed the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
MGNREGA) is “the largest and most ambitious social security and public works programme in the
world” (Mann and Pande, 2012, p. iv). Around one fourth of all rural households in India participate
in it every year (Mann and Pande, 2012), which is estimated to be 50 million people (Khera, 2011).
The central objectives of the scheme include: 
• Ensuring social protection for India’s rural poor especially Scheduled Castes and Tribes
through rights-based legalisation;
• Ensuring livelihood security through the creation of durable assets such as water security,
soil conservation;
• Strengthening decentralized, participatory planning through empowering the local
governments to assist in administering the programme; and
• Improving governance – especially transparency and accountability (Mann and Pande, 2012). 
The purpose of this case study is not to debate the implementation or impact of MGNREGA, which
remains highly contested and political. Rather, it attempts to analyse the scheme in terms of being
a rights-based design aimed to empower intrinsic citizen capabilities. In this respect, MGNREGA
is unique as a social protection programme as it includes specific design features, which are:
“bottom-up, people-centred, demand driven, rights-based” (Mann and Pande, 2012, p. 3). The rights
of MGNREGA workers include: employment on demand (in the form of an application to the local
government office); minimum wages; payment within 15 days; basic worksite facilities; and social
audit accountability and grievances mechanisms (Mann and Pande, 2012). The Act also provides a
legal framework for the implementation of the scheme, which defines clear citizen entitlements,
rights and obligations (Ehmke, 2015). Alongside this are clear institutional frameworks for how
States and local bodies should implement the Act. 
What is fascinating about MGNREGA is how such an Act, which legally empowers citizens, vis-à-vis
the State, was institutionalized. It was denounced by many as charity behind a façade of public-works
with Drèze claiming it was greeted by the middle class like ‘a wet dog at a glamorous party’
(Drèze in Kheera, 2011). The historical and institutional genesis of the Act played is key role in this.
MGNREGA was the product of a remarkable policy process, set against a backdrop of India’s history
of famine relief schemes, and an emerging election. A long trajectory of social movements in the
1990s in India, culminated in a Public Interact Litigation in 2001, which implicated the Indian State in
the rural inhabitants starving to death in the drought plagued State of Rajasthan. This gave rise to a
‘Right to Food’ campaign, a shaping and making coalition between activists, academics and poor
citizens, which lobbied for an entitlement based Employment Guarantee Act. The first draft of the
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National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in 2004 was drafted by the National Advisory Council,
a 14- member organization comprised of ex-bureaucrats, academics, civil society and lawyers,
which sought to bridge the gap between Indian civil society and the government and devise social
policies for the betterment of the poor. The involvement of citizens in shaping the policy is further
emphasized by the fact that the draft act was actually “based on an earlier draft prepared by
concerned citizens” (Drèze, 2011, p. 6). 
At the time the act was being drafted, a national election was under way, which everyone expected
the left of centre Congress party to lose. As a vote-getting mechanism, the Congress Party decided
to include the enactment and implementation of MGNREGA in their electoral manifesto. At the time,
this was not given too much thought as “most people (including the Congress leaders themselves)
were quite sure the Congress Party would lose the next elections” (Drèze, 2011, p. 6). When to the
surprise of everyone the Congress came to power in May 2004, as the leading partner in the United
Progressive Alliance government, backed by left-wing parties, the Act suddenly became a central
and strongly supported policy programme (Drèze, 2011). What followed was a period of politicking
in which various attempts were made to dilute the bill. Sustained civil society mobilization,
however, ensured that the central rights-based tenants remained (Tessitore, 2011). Eventually,
the bill was passed by Parliament, amended after campaigns from the Left parties, and then finally
passed in August 2005 (Drèze, 2011).
The employment guarantee clause of MGNREGA legally enshrines universal access to work for the
rural population of India (Ehmke, 2015). The Act furthermore actively encourages the participation of
the most vulnerable and marginalised populations such as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,
as well as having a mandatory minimum of one third participation rates for women. A key lesson
from the policy process of MGNREGA is the fact that “mobilising the poor effectively might better
be done by paying less attention to sending emissaries, organisers and propagandists down to the
grassroots, and putting more effort into providing the poor with an enabling external bureaucratic
and programme environment” (Joshi and Moore, 2000, p. 51). 
The ‘shaping and making’ policy environment, allowed for a formidable social contract to be
formulated at the heart of MGNREGA, which empowers citizens to demand work from the State and
participate in the implementation and monitoring of the Act as users and choosers. As Corbridge
attests, the “enactment of new civic prerogatives and socioeconomic entitlements as formal
statutory rights suggests an innovative State building project that aims to enhance the capacity of
citizens to see the State” (Ruparelia, 2013). MGNREGA provides a platform and interface for citizens
to engage with or ‘see the State’ through the following mechanisms: ‘muster rolls’, which have a
public display of workers names; ‘job cards’, which allow workers to scrutinize and verify the days
they have worked; and ‘social audits’ by gram sabhas, which are local self-government
organizations. As with all right-based entitlements and social accountability tools, the success of
these is premised on the citizens’ awareness of their rights and ability to engage with the State to
claim and hold it accountable. In acknowledgement of these barriers to participation, MGNREGA
includes provisions such as mandatory information campaigns by the local State actors in charge of
implementing the act. 
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Moreover, during the early stages of the design of the act, there were mass awareness generation
drives in rural India, which outlined the right to employment, a minimum wage (Kheera 2011)
and statutory access to grievance redressal mechanisms, in an attempt to engage citizens as
users and choosers. 
In terms of the social accountability mechanisms, the MGNREGA act itself is inherently participatory
as it relies on a self-targeting mechanism of rural poor demanding work. As an institution, it actively
builds political capabilities and allows citizens to engage with and assert their citizenship. This has
potential spill-over effects for the society as a whole, since with the advent of a minimum wage,
workers have more bargaining power in the private sector. Another transformative feature is the
right to demand work as an entitlement as well as its auxiliary mechanisms which include
beneficiary led social auditing mechanisms. These are manifestations of the idea of citizens as
active users and choosers at the delivery phase. MGNREGA is also rooted in the ideal of a
guaranteed social minimum, to which citizens are entitled to as a basic right. This is often difficult
to include within social protection frameworks as “the extension of the right to social protection to
the more generalized circle of citizens beyond workers becomes more difficult the more tenuous
their link with the productive economy” (Kabeer, 2014, p. 345). MGNREGA benefited from the fact
that in India, piecemeal agrarian work is widespread, and the act was thus accepted partially due
to its framing as a contract in which wages are exchanged for labour.
MGNREGA also allows citizens to be engaged as shapers and makers at the delivery phase.
For example, the provision is directly linked to a bottom-up planning process, whereby citizens can
identify the public works schemes to be undertaken. MGNREGA states that if work is not provided
within 15 days of an application being made, the applicants are entitled to an unemployment
allowance at the rate of one-fourth of the minimum wage for the first 30 days, and one half
thereafter. If denied, the State can be pursued in court. While the bulk (about 90 per cent) of
employment costs is borne by the Central Government, the employment allowance is to be paid
by the State governments. Thus, one role of the employment allowance is to act as a fine on the
State government if it fails to implement the guarantee. Seen in this light, the payment of the
employment allowance plays a key role in the realization of the work guarantee, and engages
citizens through tools to hold the State accountable. 
4.1.1  IN PRACTICE: MGNREGA AS A SOCIAL PROTECTION FLOOR WHICH EMPOWERS CITIZENS
Far from being mechanical, the implementation of MGNREGA has been just as political as the
policy process around its inception. At the central level, the advent of the current Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) government in 2014, which vocally criticizes MGNREGA, has led to reduced political
commitment. This section illustrates that while the design of MGNREGA has clear intentions to
empower citizens, the implementation of a legal right to work at the grassroots level, which
includes spaces and tools to hold the State accountable, has had mixed results. 
This can be shown in four central ways. Firstly, while MGNREGA is premised on the ability of
citizens to know and then demand their right to work, a 2011 a panel survey found differing
awareness levels of MGNREGA. In some States, 72 per cent of households knew that work could be
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demanded anytime (Rajasthan) but in others only 29 per cent of citizens were aware (Andhra Pradesh).
Secondly, in terms of grievance mechanisms awareness was low ranging from 35 per cent in Andhra
Pradesh, to 16 per cent in Rajasthan (Mann and Pande, 2012). Kheera notes the varied commitment
levels of block development officers, Panchayat Sevak (local council officer), and village headmen,
who were responsible for raising awareness. Many do not necessarily share the participatory vision
of the Act and often use it as a way to the “milk the system” (2011: xiii). State governments are also
responsible for setting up and training Social Audit Units, which facilitate the verification with
workers at work sites6, but this likewise has mixed results. Thirdly, the inability to claim rights is
also manifested in an issue which challenges the core of the act: in a representative survey of
workers only 43 days out of the 100 allocated days were claimed per person (Kheera, 2011).
Moreover, work application processes are often not operational and some States are failing to
adhere to the minimum wage. Success stories were often correlated with the presence of a local
organization who have taken it upon themselves to mobilize poor citizens. For example, the Jagrut
Advisasi Dalit Sangathan (JADS) organization, had worked together with local workers to secure
days of employment per person of the preceding 12 months (Drèze and Kheera, 2011). Finally, in
terms of the institutionalised transparency and accountability interfaces between citizens and the
State, the grievance redress mechanisms were found to be weak. For example, while 100 per cent
of the sites surveyed in Rajasthan had muster rolls signed, job cards maintained and wages paid by
workers in public spaces, in other States the respective percentages were 45 per cent (signed
muster rolls), 25 per cent (maintained job cards), 56 per cent (wages paid in public places).
The mutually reinforcing processes of implementation of MGNREGA and empowerment of citizens
are thus often stuck in a sub-optimal relationship. Similarly, this means that the language of rights
which frames MGNREGA is being undermined by a lack of State-level sanctions7 and citizen
redresses for when these rights are violated. 
In sum, the data from the grassroots paints a mixed picture of the extent to which MGNREGA has
allowed vulnerable citizens to make claims on the provision of social protection and opened up
inclusive spaces to hold the State accountable for these provisions. This should not take away from
the ambitious vision and design of the MGNREGA. By obliging citizens to demand their rights,
MGNREGA encourages the building of political capabilities – a hallmark of citizenship. This process
of building and activating citizen agency is a low burning and iterative one. The larger aims of
MGNREGA were to facilitate the formation of labour unions for vulnerable sections of rural India.
Even its biggest advocates admit to the fact that this is far from being established. While the
formation of labour unions, which are critical in mobilising citizens and fostering collective action
and social accountability is far off, MGNREGA has contributed to rural citizens being more aware of
their entitlements - a positive step in strengthening the voice of vulnerable citizens. This provides a
critical lesson from MGNREGA, one which is mirrored throughout the history of social legislation:
laws and policies provide a framework for citizen rights and entitlements, however, the realization
of these rights requires sustained political commitment at all levels, and the ability for citizens to
claim and hold duty bearers accountable for these rights. 
6 http://nrega.nic.in/Circular_Archive/archive/nrega_doc_FAQs.pdf
7 One exception here is Andhra Pradesh which has a fully-fledged system of institutionalized social audits.
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MGNREGA also offers lessons in terms of designing justice-based notions of social protection. Social
protection derives legitimacy and sustainability if supported by legislation. By embedding social
protection as a legal act, in constitutional provisions, MGNREGA allows citizens to engage and lobby
to provide political momentum to the implementation of the Act. In this respect, MGNREGA “can be
seen as step towards legal enforcement of the right to work. It is a limited step, especially since the
employment guarantee is limited to ‘100 days per household per year’. Nevertheless the act has much
value as a tool of empowerment for rural labourers” (Drèze, 2011, p. 4). The fact it is a law should also
not be underestimated; it provides both durability and allows citizens legal entitlements, enabling
citizens “to become aware of their rights and learn how to defend them … and creates a consensus
in the society at large, on the legitimacy of workers’ demands for employment” (ibid, p. 9).
4.2. Bolsa Família
Brazil’s story of decades of excessive inequality and poverty fuelled by exclusionary growth
models and regressive social policy is well known (Wetzel, 2013). In fact, in the second half of the
20th century, Brazil had one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world, with the poorest
sixty percent of the population having only four per cent of the wealth, while the richest twenty
percent held fifty-eight per cent.
Today, Brazil is hailed as a huge success story with regards to inequality and poverty reduction.
Over a 12-year period, Brazil has more than halved extreme poverty (from 9.7 to 4.3 percent) and
has made huge strides in reducing income inequality from a Gini coefficient of around 0.68 to 0.527.
This change is frequently attributed to President Lula’s government, which launched the innovative
Bolsa Família Programme (BFP), scaling up and coordinating scattered existing initiatives under a
powerfully simple concept: trusting poor families with small cash transfers in return for keeping
their children in school and attending preventive health care visits. BFP brought together four
existing programmes: Bolsa Escola for boosting school attendance; Bolsa Alimentaçao for maternal
nutrition; Cartao Alimentaçao for food support and Auxílio Gas, a gas subsidy (Hall, 2006). 
The three central objectives of the BFP are to: 1.) reduce current poverty and inequality through
providing a minimum level of income support to extremely poor families; 2.) tackle chronic poverty
by conditioning the transfers on human capital requirements, and; 3.) empower women within the
households through ensuring cash payments are given directly to women.
Bolsa Família became the flagship policy and a central priority under the Lula government. It has
significantly expanded its value and coverage since its inception (Daieff, 2015). BFP is the largest
cash transfer of its kind in the world, currently reaching almost 14 million families - an estimated
55 million citizens, making up for a quarter of Brazil’s rural and urban population. The programme is
hailed as a global success story, a reference point for social policy around the world. It is widely
attributed to be responsible for a 12 per cent reduction in the poverty gap and a 19 per cent
reduction in the poverty severity measure (Soares, Ribas and Osório, 2010).8
8 According to Barrientos (2003), ‘the poverty headcount would be 4.2 per cent higher for the Brazil sample […] if pension
income is removed [...]. Indigence headcount would rise by around 9.6 per cent in the Brazil sample, all else being equal’
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To understand why Bolsa Família became such an impactful flagship programme, it is important to
trace its evolution from a number of angles. Institutional policy analysis by Barrientos (2013a) and
others show that while the Lula Government did consolidate a number of fragmented social
programmes under Bolsa Família, the historical and political genesis of the programme came much
earlier, and as a result of champions for change at the national level, but also from local level pressure
and active citizen involvement emerging from the success of municipal-run poverty-focused pilot
programmes. The 1988 Constitution marked a radical break with the past decades of dictatorship
and social repression. Although social welfare and assistance were not of prominent concern within
the discussions of the constituent assembly, the discussions nonetheless led to a significant change
in the principles underpinning social policy in Brazil (Barrientos, 2013a). Social assistance was
established as a social right based on citizenship for which the State held primary responsibility.
The legal and institutional framework facilitated subsequent opportunities for interfacing between
the Government and citizens. Furthermore, the Constitution acknowledged the right of specific
vulnerable groups (the elderly and disabled) to a minimum guaranteed income. Prior to 1988,
Brazil adhered to Bismarckian-like welfare principles, where contributory social provision was the
mainstay – contributory pensions for workers being a large national programme. Post-Constitution
social protection now included both insurance and assistance based measures, with social pensions
being rolled out to those unable to work, and social security being extended to the rural sector and
informal workers in agriculture. These two pension programmes reached over 10 million people
with a budget that is more than double that of the BFP. 
Bolsa Família came from quite different origins, although the 1988 constitution provided the
legitimacy needed to ensure that social assistance became established as a Government
responsibility and a citizen’s right. Barrientos describes the emergence of the minimum guarantee
income idea and the evolutions of a variety of social assistance programmes that eventually
became rolled into Bolsa Família. What is striking is the story of its genesis in visionary champions-
for-change. Eduardo Suplicy, the Workers Party’s first elected Senator who proposed the 1991 Bill
for a tax-transfer scheme, Jose Marcio Camargo, an influential academic with a strong reputation
for research on poverty (Barrientos, 2013a), and Senator Cristovam Buarque who was instrumental
in the design of Bolsa Escolar.The latter was insistent that sustainable inroads on poverty reduction
would only be achieved through improving the productive capacity of poor households (this likely
influenced the education and health conditions in Bolsa Família). These influential voices coincided
with the outworking of the decentralisation agenda that was initiated by the 1988 Constitution.
A number of municipalities chose to pilot and experiment with guaranteed income schemes linked
to a range of schooling and health interventions. Before long, these pilots were being replicated in
many municipalities and scaled up to the federal level. These guaranteed income programmes
gained so much popular support, that when Lula attempted to prioritise a Zero Hunger programme
over these programmes, he faced substantial local-level resistance. As a result, in 2003, Lula
decided to set up Bolsa Família, as a single programme that integrated the other subsidy
programmes that existed at the time. 
This brief history shows the complex pathway by which social protection became grounded in a
justice-based model in Brazil. First, a Constitution that emerged out of a huge social debt on the back
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of decades of economic and political inequality and one that established social protection as a
citizenship right. Second, strong and influential champions for change who were key in ensuring that
legislation was put in place to hold the State responsible for its citizens. And third, municipal activism
that held the Government to account and that influenced the evolution of social assistance in Brazil. 
As with the MGNREGA case study, the purpose here is not to debate the implementation or impact
of Bolsa Família, but to analyse the programme in terms of being a rights-based design aimed to
empower intrinsic citizen capabilities. Like MGNREGA, Bolsa Família held the promise of
empowering programme beneficiaries - in particular, women - to build better and more productive
livelihoods for themselves and their families. But how did this pan out in practice? Have
programme beneficiaries been able to shape and influence the interface between the State and
themselves or has the programme been primarily one of State provision to beneficiary consumers
and users? Recent exploratory work by Sugiyama (2016) interrogates the pathways that have played
a role in promoting the accountability of the BFP. 
Findings from interviews with beneficiaries of Bolsa Família, as well as local and federal level officials,
highlight limited use of citizen- and community-driven participatory mechanisms for monitoring
accountability. Top-down, more administrative monitoring and auditing mechanisms provide the
primary mechanisms for social accountability. For instance, Social Assistance Councils at federal,
State and municipality levels, provide accountability in allocation of resources and implementation.
This is interesting, as without knowledge about the institutional and political contexts, one might
conclude that beneficiaries and citizens remain passive in relation to the State. In other words, the fact
that beneficiaries are not substantially engaged in citizen-led programme monitoring may call into
question the success of the programme for empowerment outcomes based on active citizenship and
justice-based social provision, as we discussed in earlier sections of this paper. 
However, deeper multi-stakeholder and policy analysis by Sugiyama illustrates that the absence of
citizen-led programme ‘controls’ rather than providing evidence of a weak civic consciousness, is
more likely to stand as evidence of well-functioning and responsive state-centred mechanisms and
bottom-up oversight – nurtured by decentralization and a history of protest politics. That is, citizens
are confident and content overall with the provisions of Bolsa Família – the transparency provided
to them by the Government via top-down administrative mechanisms, and their ability to hold the
government to account through the local and federal electoral processes. We would argue that the
fact that Bolsa Família involves cross-sector cooperation as one of the programme’s conditionality
requirements (i.e. the Ministries of Social Development, Education and Health have to collaborate
both horizontally and vertically) is a very significant factor in explaining the high levels of
implementation transparency and integrity of the programme. This conditionality – that holds the
State accountable, rather than just the households or individual – is highly progressive and one
which other countries would do well to implement alongside cash transfer programmes. 
This brief review of Bolsa Família illustrates that the limited use of ‘usual’ citizen-driven policy
control mechanisms, such as, local councils and committees or civil mobilization, on the ground
does not necessarily imply a passive citizenry. ‘While none of our focus group participants reported
they had engaged in recent protests, several groups identified protests and mobilizations as a
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reasonable and likely political strategy if they needed to defend the programme’ (Sugiyama, 2016,
p. 1199). In the context of freedom and provision of information, top-down administrative
mechanism to promote accountability appear to have positive, tangible effects for citizens.
Importantly, citizens see BF as a fair and accessible right that is sustained and not just a hand out.
If this perception were to change, then citizens would become ‘visibly active’.
As in any country, social protection, and Bolsa Família in this specific case, continues to evolve.
Barrientos believes that provision of ‘a citizenship-based guaranteed minimum income is likely to
grow in strength [in Brazil]’ (Barrientos, 2013a, p. 907). As with the example of MGNREGA, social
assistance in Brazil positions the State’s responsibility as taking primacy over citizen’s rights.
The responsibility, if taken seriously, will translate into economic and political inclusion for all
citizens and this describes the remit of a justice-based approach to social protection. 
Of course, the way that the justice-based system has emerged varies in the different country cases.
The case of MGNREGA illustrates an active and vocal citizenry requiring the State to meet its
responsibility, while in Brazil the legal and policy machinery enabled experimentation at the local
level, a subsequent groundswell of support for social and economic guarantees and a consequent
pressure on the State not to relinquish its responsibilities. The end result is a justice based system, in
both cases, where citizens can, when necessary, insist that the State deliver legally constituted rights.
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5. AN IN-DEPTH CASE STUDY OF LEAP - GHANA
5.1 A justice-based approach to social protection in Ghana?
Ghana’s social protection landscape has witnessed a tremendous transformation during the last
decade. Beyond the introduction of several social policy interventions during the 2000s9, the
country developed its first National Social Protection Strategy between 2005 and 2007. It has also
recently launched a national social protection policy. Founded on the principle that every Ghanaian
matters and is capable of contributing her or his quota to national development, the national social
protection strategy argues that vulnerable populations are often characterised by a rampant denial
of rights, the inability to demand accountability, facing institutional barriers that underpin their
vulnerability (Government of Ghana, 2007b). In this context, the strategy’s vision for social
protection in Ghana was to “provide safeguards for, and empower individuals and households
living under extreme conditions of poverty to become responsible managers of their livelihoods,
and claim their societal rights and entitlements” (Ibid, p. 9). This expression is in line with the
rights-based rhetoric to social protection which recognises citizens not merely as consumers of
public services, but also as shapers of their own socio-economic well-being.
A recent significant step towards the adoption of a rights-based approach to social protection in
Ghana has been the creation of a coordination agency in the form of a government ministry that has
contributed to a more holistic approach to social protection. As Kaltenborn, Abdulai, Roelen, Hague,
and Palermo (2016) have argued, the lack of coordination between different authorities with
responsibilities for implementing various social protection programmes not only leads to
inefficiencies and higher costs, but also reduces transparency; and thus, complicates beneficiaries’
access to programmes. Effective coordination is also important for effectively targeting social
interventions, without which it will be difficult to establish the effects of social protection on the
poorest segments of the population. In 2013, the Government of Ghana created the Ministry of
Gender, Children and Social Protection (MoGCSP) and appointed a key well-known human rights
advocate as its head. Subsequently in June 2014, the Ministry was given cabinet approval to take a
leadership role in the development of a comprehensive social protection policy, and take steps to
ensure sufficient and sustainable resources for social protection. The social protection landscape
witnessed dramatic improvements under the Minister. This included the drafting of a social protection
bill aimed at anchoring the major social protection programmes in law, as well as the launch of a
national social protection policy and the Ghana National Household Registry (GNHR) – a single
registry database of the most vulnerable households that would be used by all social protection
programmes in order to provide comprehensive support for the poorest. Other important initiatives
under this well-known gender-sensitive Minister included the nation-wide expansion of the LEAP
programme to all administrative districts, greater efforts in providing free health services to LEAP
beneficiaries by linking them to the National Health Insurance Scheme, and the inclusion of poor
pregnant women among the LEAP target group. All of these steps highlight the significant recent
progress towards the adoption of a more justice-based approach to social protection in Ghana.
9 These programmes include a new contributory national health insurance scheme (2003), a national school feeding
programme (2005), capitation grants to expand free primary education (2005), and the flagship Livelihood
Empowerment against Poverty (LEAP) cash transfer programme (2008).
IWP-14 – Social Protection and active citizenship.qxp_Layout 1  06/10/17  19:22  Pagina 28
29
LINKING SOCIAL RIGHTS TO ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP FOR THE MOST VULNERABLE 
Innocenti Working Paper 2017-14
In June 2016, Ghana launched a national social protection policy (NSPS) whose main goal is to
“deliver a well-coordinated, inter-sectoral social protection system enabling people to live in dignity
through income support, livelihoods empowerment and improved access to systems of basic
services” (Government of Ghana, 2015, p. 15). The NSPS provides a framework for delivering social
protection in a coherent fashion, and defines a social protection floor within a Ghanaian context.
The idea of a social protection floor – defined in the Ghanaian context as a “set of basic rights,
services and facilities that a global citizen should enjoy” (Government of Ghana, 2012) – is intrinsic
to the justice-based approach to social protection as it seeks to ensure that the extreme poor have
access to basic social services and cash grants that enable them to have decent standards of
living.10The Ghanaian social protection floor, as defined in the national social protection policy,
seeks to balance social assistance, social security and productive inclusion among vulnerable
populations (Government of Ghana, 2015, p. 2).
The NSPS also recognizes the significance of stronger measures that promote active citizenship and
beneficiary rights within Ghana’s social protection landscape. Three areas of accountability are
provided for in the policy: general accountability; social accountability, grievance handling and
feedback; and financial accountability. In line with the justice-based approach to social protection
highlighted above, the policy distinguishes between the ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ sides of social
protection, and emphasises the ‘critical’ role of social accountability, grievance handling and
feedback mechanisms for an effective social protection system. However, for reasons explained in
the next section, demand-side accountability mechanisms in the form of beneficiaries’ feedback on
the implementation of various social protection programmes remain relatively weak in Ghana. 
One major weakness of Ghana’s social protection system with regards to the promotion of active
citizenship is the absence of strong legal backing in the existing individual social protection
programmes. The 1992 Constitution enjoins every government to pursue the establishment of ‘a
just and free society’ via the creation of equal opportunities for all citizens. The Constitution further
mandates the State to promote just and reasonable access by all citizens to public facilities and
services, provide adequate means of livelihood and suitable employment and public assistance to
the needy, as well as ‘provide social assistance to the aged such as will enable them to maintain a
decent standard of living’. However, beyond these broad-brushed constitutional provisions, most
individual social protection programmes as well as the overall institutional framework for social
protection in Ghana are not anchored in law1. Consequently, nearly all of Ghana’s social protection
interventions tend to be “based on somewhat volatile budget statements that have to be
renegotiated for each fiscal period” (ILO, 2014, p. 67). 
This said, it is important to note that Ghana has recently taken further steps to strengthen the legal
framework for social protection by developing a Social Protection Bill (SPB) which seeks to give
10 All LEAP beneficiaries as well as all children benefiting from the school feeding programme are required to have free
NHIS cards. The gender ministry has made a lot of progress in linking these beneficiaries to the NHIS in recent times.
11The only notable exceptions are the National Health Insurance Act 2003 (Act 650) and the National Pensions Act,
2008 (Act 766).
IWP-14 – Social Protection and active citizenship.qxp_Layout 1  06/10/17  19:22  Pagina 29
30
LINKING SOCIAL RIGHTS TO ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP FOR THE MOST VULNERABLE 
Innocenti Working Paper 2017-14
legal identity to the national targeting unit (known as the Ghana National Household Registry),
the LEAP programme, and the Ghana School Feeding Programme (GSFP). If this bill is successfully
passed into law, it will contribute to strengthening the legal environment of social protection and
create a stronger social protection framework that empowers and protects all citizens.12 In its
2016 election manifesto, the NDC government, which drafted the SPB, pledged to pursue its quick
passage and implementation (NDC, 2016). However, with the change in government that followed
the December 2016 elections, it remains to be seen if the newly-elected NPP administration will take
this bill further or accord it the necessary priority. 
5.2 The state of social accountability and active citizenship in Ghana
In this section, we draw mainly from various rounds of the Afrobarometer surveys to assess the state
of social accountability in Ghana, focusing specifically on two key indicators, namely citizens’
engagement with State authorities, and the extent to which citizens participate in local
decision-making processes. Based on data from the most recent Afrobarometer survey (Round 6,
2014/2015), Figure 3 reports on respondents’ views regarding how citizens should react to poor quality
service provisioning on the part of service providers. A majority of respondents (64.7 per cent)
reported that citizens must always complain to government officials when public services are of
poor quality, suggesting that Ghanaians do generally have a good knowledge of what is expected
of an active citizenry in order to enhance the delivery of quality basic services to the poor.
However, evidence from the Afrobarometer surveys suggest that levels of active citizenship among
Ghanaians remains weak.
Figure 3 - Do citizens complain about poor services?13
Source: Afrobarometer Round 6, 2014/2015
12 http://www.thefinderonline.com/News/National-Social-Protection-Policy-launched.html
13 Question: Please tell me whether you think it is something a good citizen in a democracy should always do, never do,
or do only if they choose?  Complain to government officials when public services are of poor quality.
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As shown in Table 1, most Ghanaians do not have consistent engagement with their authorities -
a problem attributed partly to the absence of both ‘invited’ and ‘claimed’ spaces through which
effective State-society engagements could be fostered. In the past year, the majority of Ghanaians
never contacted an official at a government agency (89 per cent), their Member of Parliament
(87 per cent), a political party official (86 per cent) and their local government councillor
(72 per cent) about important problems or to give them their views (Table 1). Since 2002, the
majority of Ghanaians (from 72 per cent to 89 per cent) never interfaced with their elected national
and local representatives, an official at any government ministry/agency or an official of a political
party. These findings provide strong support for Jones et al. (2009) observation that ‘notions of
citizenship and rights are not well embedded within Ghanaian political culture’ (p.72). We return to
provide an explanation for this. 
Table 1 - Popular Ratings of Citizens’ Engagement with the State (per cent)
2002 2005 2008 2012 2015
Contacted Member of Parliament Never 87 83 85 86 87
Once/A few times/often 12 16 14 13 10
Contacted Local Councillor Never 83 85 63 68 72
Once/A few times/often 15 14 36 31 17
Contacted Political Party Official Never 84 78 85 86
Once/A few times/often 15 21 14 10
Contacted Gov’t Official at a Ministry Never 90 86 86 89 89
Once/A few times/often 9 13 13 10 8
Source: Compiled from Ghana Afrobarometer Surveys 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011 and 2014/2015
Another important indicator of active citizenship is the extent to which citizens express interest in,
and have the capacity to, hold their leaders accountable through associational activities and
collaborative community action. Yet since 2002, an overwhelming majority of Afrobarometer
respondents have consistently noted that they have never attended a protest or demonstration.
While this draws attention to the weaknesses of claimed spaces in the Ghanaian context, it is
important to note that an increasing number of Afrobarometer respondents have indicated their
willingness to join a protest march if they have the chance to do so. More importantly, 55 per cent
of Ghanaians have never attended a community meeting, while 65 per cent have never joined
others to raise issues concerning the developmental challenges of their communities. However,
39 per cent and 43 per cent of those same respondents, respectively, answered that they would do
so if they had the opportunity (Table 2). This suggests that whereas Ghanaians are generally willing
to attend community meetings and join others to raise issues, they do not have the necessary
‘invited spaces’ for doing so effectively. 
Three important factors explain the relatively weak state of social accountability and active citizenship
in Ghana, namely a weak decentralized system of governance, the prevalence and deepening of
patron-client relations associated with increased electoral competition; and a relatively weak civil
society. First, although Ghana has supposedly been implementing an ambitious system of
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decentralization since the late 1980s, decentralization has been a donor-driven agenda, with clear
‘evidence of resistance by the government to its implementation’ (Crawford and Abdulai, 2009, p. 107).
The President wields significant appointive powers at the local level, appointing not only 30 per cent
of all local assembly members, but also District Chief Executives (DCEs) who are the highest political
authorities at the local level. Key local government officials such as DCEs therefore tend to be
upwardly accountable to the appointing authority, the President, not downwardly accountable to local
populations (Crawford, 2008). This has often resulted in limited buy-in among local populations, as
development programmes fail to reflect sub-national realities.
Table 2 - Citizens’ Engagement in Community Meetings and Communal Action (per cent)
2002 2005 2008 2012 2015
Attend community meetings No (Would never do this) 22 6 8 16 16
No (But would do if had the chance) 20 37 33 42 39
Yes ( Once/twice, several times/often 57 56 58 42 31
Joining others to raise revenue No (Would never do this) 37 11 13 26 22
No (But would do if had the chance) 22 37 33 37 43
Yes (Once/twice, several times/often) 39 51 53 37 24
Attend demonstrations /protest No (Would never do this) 83 67 69 84 59
No (But would do if had the chance) 8 22 20 11 32
Yes (Once/twice, several times/often) 8 8 9 4 6
Source: Compiled Ghana Afrobarometer Surveys 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012 and /2015
Opportunities for the exercise of active citizenship are further undermined by weak and dysfunctional
sub-district structures (e.g. Unit Committees) that have been established to provide mechanisms for
grassroots political participation. Indeed, there is general apathy towards the operations of these
structures because most people who are working on them are not paid; being a member of these
structures is completely sacrificial and voluntary. Consequently, many of the sub-district structures
lack the required number of memberships to operate (Ayee and Amponsah, 2003, p. 70).
In its manifesto for the December 2016 elections, the New Patriotic Party which won the elections
pledged to strengthen the sub-district structures through capacity building and adequate resource
allocation, as well ensure the direct election of DCEs within its first 24 months in office (NPP, 2016,
p. 141). This perhaps represents a significant window of opportunity in terms of the creation of
more ‘invited spaces’ that would enable poorer citizens to influence decision-making processes and
hold service providers more accountable. 
A second important factor for understanding the relatively weak state of active citizenship in Ghana
relates to the highly clientelistic nature of politics (see Lindberg (2010); Lindberg and Morrison
(2008); MacLean (2014)), one in which many ordinary citizens rely on patron–client relationships in
securing ‘citizenship status’ (Paller, 2014, p. 124) and in gaining access to basic services such as
education (Abdulai and Hickey, 2016) and electricity (Briggs, 2012). Despite the deepening
democracy and electoral accountability, political clientelism is widely noted to have increased in
IWP-14 – Social Protection and active citizenship.qxp_Layout 1  06/10/17  19:22  Pagina 32
33
LINKING SOCIAL RIGHTS TO ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP FOR THE MOST VULNERABLE 
Innocenti Working Paper 2017-14
Ghana. Indeed, some scholars have even characterized Ghana’s democratic environment as one of
‘competitive clientelism’ where two dominant political parties compete in the use of elections as a
mechanism for the distribution of patronage and State resources to award politicians’ followers
(Abdulai and Hulme, 2015; Hirvi and Whitfield, 2015). This has contributed to undermining the
exercise of active citizenship in Ghana.
The third factor relates to the weaknesses of civil society. Although Ghana is home to a vibrant civil
society, civil society has not been effectively included in the social protection dialogue in Ghana.
The core impact of the CSO sector remains at the level of service delivery, and CSOs generally
remain at the periphery of policy-making. For example, Ghana’s national social protection strategy
began as a government-only policy agenda, although CSOs did contribute towards its development
through their inclusion in a steering committee that was established to guide the implementation of
the strategy (Duho, 2015). Overall, however, CSOs play a limited role in demanding social
protection as a right and in holding governments accountable for the implementation of social
protection programmes (Ibid). Some CSOs are beginning to address these limitations, particularly
by tracking the distribution of social protection expenditures.14 However, CSOs have continued to
face significant challenges in demanding accountability from government, including the absence of
a freedom of information law. 
5.3 Citizenship, social accountability and the LEAP cash transfer programme 
The LEAP is Ghana’s flagship cash transfer programme that provides bi-monthly cash transfers to
households living below the national extreme poverty line. The programme targets poor families
which also have at least a member that is aged (above 65 years), disabled who are unable to work
(PWDs), orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs) and more recently households with a pregnant
woman and children below one year of age. The overall goal of the LEAP is to increase long-term
human capital development among the poorest and most vulnerable populations (Ministry of
Employment and Social Welfare, 2012). The level of the LEAP benefit varies, depending on the
number of eligible people in a household, and the total number of beneficiary households has
expanded rapidly overtime, increasing from just 1,654 in 2008 (selected from 21 districts) to
213,000 households in all 216 districts of Ghana at the end of 2016.15The programme is
implemented by the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) which is under the Ministry of Gender,
Children and Social Protection (MoGCSP).
To what extent, and in what ways, has the design and implementation of the LEAP provided
opportunities for the exercise of active citizenship in Ghana? Has the LEAP created ‘invited spaces’
that enable its beneficiaries to participate actively in decision making and hold service providers
accountable? The implementation arrangements of the LEAP make room for the exercise of active
citizenship through three main mechanisms: beneficiary forums, community LEAP implementation
committees (CLICs), and grievance mechanisms. In what follows, we discuss each of these
mechanisms, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses. We seek to answer these questions
14 Notable among these CSOs are the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development, the Integrated Social Development
Centre and the Social Enterprise Development Foundation.
15 http://leap.gov.gh/44th-payment-cycle-of-leap-social-cash-grant-212848-households-to-be-paid-for-the-months-of-july-
and-august-2016/
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through a desk review of available studies and reports, as well as through in-depth interviews with
four key informants in the LEAP Management unit. 
First, the design of the LEAP programme, with its strong focus on CLICs and the involvement of
community leaders in implementation and monitoring activities, provides a window of opportunity
for community participation in the implementation and management of the programme, as well as
creating feedback loops between beneficiaries and the DSW (Jones et al. 2009). Within a district,
community LEAP implementation committees (CLICs), comprising of traditional leaders, district
assembly members, representatives of teachers and nurses, religious leaders, and NGO
representatives were to play a wide range of roles, including compiling complaints and appeals,
as well as identifying the most vulnerable households in their communities as part of the targeting
processes (Government of Ghana, 2007a). Based on field interviews, Oduro (2015) suggests that
the CLICs have played an important role in facilitating the participation of previously excluded local
populations in decision-making processes at the local level, and that the LEAP has ‘created
pathways that encouraged local participation’, enabling beneficiaries to ‘become active and
responsible citizens rather than being passive receivers of social handouts’ (Oduro, 2015, p. 32).
However, our interviews with key informants within the LEAP programme office show that the
CLICs have suffered from several shortcomings. First, the CLIC membership has faced significant
attrition challenges due to its voluntary nature and the continuing requests from CLIC members for
remuneration has stirred up concerns that the CLIC structure may not be sustainable in the long
run. Reports abound that many CLIC members abscond their responsibilities due to the lack of
remuneration, whiles others have tried to extort money from LEAP beneficiaries during payments.
Moreover, the CLICs are mostly constituted by members of the local elite, and has in some cases
led to local patronage and clientelism in the form of biased selections of beneficiary households.
These problems have resulted in a recentralisation of the beneficiary selection processes in ways
that have further eroded community engagements with the LEAP. For example, while the CLICS
were originally required to do an initial identification of the most vulnerable households in their
communities, the CLICs no longer play a role in the targeting of beneficiary households. 
Another mechanism through which the LEAP facilitates citizen participation is the beneficiary forums
held on paydays. The beneficiary forum is a mechanism for raising the beneficiaries’ awareness of
their duties and responsibilities with respect to utilizing the cash transfers, and for the observance of
LEAP conditions. These forums have brought some form of recognition to otherwise socially excluded
groups like PWDs, providing them with an opportunity to serve as ‘partners’ in shaping the future of
their communities (Oduro, 2015, p. 32). This said, it is important to note that the beneficiary forums are
primarily meant to share information and raise awareness of beneficiaries’ duties and responsibilities
rather than as act as genuine platforms for holding service providers accountable.
Finally, the LEAP programme has recently developed and tested a case management system that
seeks to allow ‘beneficiaries and any other stakeholder to file complaints concerning the payment
system, quality of service being provided and other aspects of the programme’ (Ministry of
Employment and Social Welfare, 2012). Among others, the objectives of the case management
system are to provide LEAP beneficiaries some opportunities to present their appeals regarding
the entire LEAP project cycle and file claims concerning payments and complaints on the quality of
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the service received. The case management processes also provide opportunities for potential
beneficiaries to appeal to the programme’s management in cases where they feel they have been
wrongly excluded. As with the requirements of the operational manual, LEAP beneficiaries have the
right to complain not only about their dissatisfaction with the payment mechanisms, but also about
delays in the resolutions of their complaints as well as about the general quality of services they
received. By these requirements, the programme primarily seeks to ‘promote active participation
from the beneficiaries’ (Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare, 2012). 
However, the LEAP case management system has encountered a number of implementation
challenges, including excessive delays in the resolution of cases. Such delays have resulted from
limited human resource capacity (interview, LEAP Programme Manager) and the overly centralised
approach to resolving cases (interview, Cash Transfer Specialist). This implies that rather than
strengthening district level structures to be able to investigate complaints and appeals, the current
approach entails the deployment of large number of LEAP staff at the centre to the field to
investigate cases. This approach is not only costly, but has also resulted in delays in the resolution
of reported cases with some potential adverse implications for the continuous commitment of
beneficiaries in the reporting of cases (Coffey International, 2016: 170). Since 2014, a total of
2,120 cases have been reported, out of which 1,179 (55.5 per cent) have been resolved (Ibid, p.9).
Not surprisingly, and despite the establishment of a case management system for LEAP, recent
studies on the programme conclude that “spaces for claiming entitlements have been minimal and
limited” (p.34), while the State’s accountability to the programme’s beneficiaries remains “weak”
(Oduro, 2015, p. 27). Based on a survey of some 2,400 LEAP cash recipients across the country,
the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) also concludes that LEAP beneficiaries
do not have any effective mechanism through which to express their concerns and hold the State
accountable (CDD Ghana, 2016). While the sector Minister hinted in 2015 that the LEAP programme
will introduce hotlines to encourage complaints and feedback as a way of enhancing citizen
participation and social accountability,16 this has not happened to date. The overall implication is
that even though the LEAP has created some spaces for State-society interactions (e.g. through the
beneficiary forums), opportunities for active citizenship and bottom-up approaches to accountability
within the programme remains weak.
Moreover, unlike in Brazil where Bolsa Família participants often view the programme as a social
right (Sugiyama, 2016, p. 1202), there is still a general perception of the LEAP cash grant in Ghana
as a favour from the government. Although official policy documents frequently refer to social
protection in Ghana as ‘an investment in long-term economic development’ rather than as wasteful
handouts to undeserving poor (Government of Ghana, 2007a, 2012), many LEAP beneficiaries still
see the programme as a favour from the State and not a right to which they are entitled. As Oduro
(2015, p. 34) notes in his study on ‘Cash transfers and citizenship in Ghana’, many LEAP beneficiaries
often refer to the cash grant as ‘Abban Sika’, i.e. ‘the government money’. From the justice-based
approach to social protection, this represents a major setback because as Sugiyama (2016) notes,
understanding cash transfer programmes in rights-based terms can allow the poor to defend those
16 See Ghana News Agency, October 16 2015, ‘Assessment of Social Protection Delivery in
Ghana’.https://www.modernghana.com/news/649699/assessment-of-social-protection-delivery-in-ghana.html 
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rights against the State or others when they deny them access to it. In contrast, where programmes
are viewed as the product of government’s discretion, it becomes difficult for citizens to meaningfully
engage in monitoring activities to demand government activity. One interviewee attributed
the persistent perception of the LEAP as a favour to the limited education that accompanied the
introduction of the LEAP programme: ‘It is because of the way they were introduced into
the programme… Nobody went and told them it is your right; this is the money that is provided by
the tax payer and when you are selected, it is your right in this programme and you must receive
each and every payment. .... Nobody has given them that confidence’.17 This analysis suggests that
the implementation of the LEAP programme did not parallel with an effective education and
community sensitization effort (Oduro, 2015, p. 33).
The general perception of the LEAP as a favour from government was somewhat deepened by the
erratic payment of benefits during the initial years of the programme. Until August 2013, payments
of LEAP grants were generally highly erratic, and the cash transfers were often in arrears of several
months. This somewhat undermined the programme’s capacity to serve as a predictable source of
income to beneficiary households. In 2011, LEAP households received an amount equivalent to only
four payments (instead of six) in three irregular instalments (instead of six) – with two instalments
at the beginning of the year and one instalment (equivalent a double payment) in the middle of the
year. In 2012, LEAP households received an amount equivalent to nine payments instead of six to
help overcome arrears. But again, these were often grouped together, with three payments
transferred in February 2012. In 2013, an amount equivalent to five payments (of the required six)
was disbursed in three instalments but with no payments received until August (Ragno et al., 2016). 
Although LEAP households have received regular payments since August 2013, a number of factors
still undermine the capacity of the programme in the promotion of active citizenship. First, and
precisely because of the limited knowledge of the programme among its beneficiaries, caregivers of
some households still do not know how much they are entitled to in the programme. One key
informant at the LEAP office stated that some beneficiaries do not even bother to check the accuracy of
the amount they receive, fearing that questioning the sufficiency/accuracy of the cash grant may attract
the anger of the payment officers and potentially lead to their exclusion from the list of beneficiaries.
This represents a significant limitation to the LEAP as a justice-based cash transfer programme.
The fact that many beneficiaries don’t know how much cash grant is due them means that they can
easily be paid less than the amount they are entitled to. While the programme has recently started
implementing an electronic payment system, this system, on its own, is incapable of eliminating the
potential risks of funding loss associated with beneficiaries’ limited knowledge of their entitlements.
One approach that has been adopted by the programme in enhancing beneficiary awareness of the
programme has been the distribution of booklets and posters that provide information on what the
LEAP is about, and on households’ rights and responsibilities. However, and given the generally low
level of literacy among the LEAP cash grant recipients, the impact of this approach is likely to remain
very limited, at best. Instead, what seems to hold a much stronger promise is to incorporate
educational sessions both during the enrolment processes and on payment days.
17 Ibid
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Another factor that has contributed to undermining LEAP as an entitlement-based cash transfer
programme relates to the generally low value of the transfer. In 2010, the value of the transfer was
7 per cent of consumption, which did not compare favourably with other successful programmes
elsewhere which transferred at least 20 per cent of consumption to beneficiaries (Handa et al. 2014).
Figure 4 shows transfer amounts as a share of average beneficiary consumption for several cash
transfer programmes in Africa and elsewhere. It shows that in 2010, the LEAP transfer was the
lowest of all and less than half the size of the next lowest value - Mozambique.
Figure 4 - Transfer as share of beneficiary consumption in various countries
Source: DFID Ghana (2012)
However, it is important to note that the programme has taken steps to address the low value of
the cash grant, which was tripled in late 2012 and again revised upwards in 2015. Prior to 2012,
beneficiary households receive bi-monthly, in a range between GH¢ 16 to GH¢ 30. These amounts
were revised twice in 2012 and 2015 (Ragno et al. 2016). Currently, however, a one-member
household receives bimonthly GH¢64, a household with two eligible members receives GH¢76,
while households with three eligible beneficiaries get GH¢88. Those with four eligible beneficiaries
or more receive GH¢106 (Appiah, 2015). The current amount translates to roughly 18 per cent of
consumption, so it is still on the low end of the spectrum. However, high inflation in Ghana
continues to undermine the real value of the grant.
What role did donors play in this? Until quite recently, implementation of Ghana’s main social
protection programmes depended quite heavily on donor funding. In particular, although the LEAP
has been described as a ‘domestically-initiated’ programme (Grebe, 2015, p. 22), it is difficult to
envisage how this programme could have been successfully implemented without donor support.
Between 2010 and 2016, the UK government’s Department for International Development (DFID)
alone committed some £36.4 million for the implementation of LEAP.18
18 See DFID’s website at: https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-201629.
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More importantly, earmarked-donor funding has contributed to making the LEAP a more justice-based
programme in at least two ways. Firstly, when the GoG increased the LEAP cash grant per beneficiary
household in 2012, it did so primarily with additional donor resources, including the DFID funding
noted above and a US$20 million World Bank support to the programme.19 Secondly, donor funding
has contributed to expanding the LEAP to the poorer northern regions of the country. In the initial
phase of the LEAP, a political decision was made to ensure that that the programme was implemented
in all regions and to build on a pre-pilot programme in HIV/AIDS-prevalent districts in the south
(Amuzu, Jones and Pereznieto, 2010, p. 35). One consequence was the marginalization of the
historically poorer northern regions of the country where the problem of food insecurity is most
prevalent. It was through a specifically earmarked World Bank loan that the LEAP was subsequently
scaled up in the north (Ibid). This underscores the contribution of the donor community in the gradual
shift towards a more justice-based approach to social protection in Ghana. 
In conclusion, Ghana has made strides with regards to the adoption of a justice-based system of
social protection. In particular, significant improvements have been made with regards to the
establishment of a Ministry charged with the protection of the rights of the vulnerable, the adoption
of a national social protection policy, and the increased efforts in anchoring the major social
protection programmes in law. However, significant limitations also remain, particularly with regards
to the creation of inclusive spaces that act as mechanisms or opportunities for beneficiaries to hold
duty-bearers and service-providers accountable. Demand-side accountability mechanisms that enable
citizens to assess programme performance and hold service-providers accountable remain weak.
While recent efforts to address these challenges have included the establishment of a case
management system for the LEAP programmes, citizens and beneficiaries have limited knowledge
about it. Together with the delays in redressing citizens’ complaints and appeals, this has rendered the
case management system ineffective in promoting social accountability within the LEAP programme.
Overall, our evidence suggests that beneficiaries of the LEAP cash grant can best be characterised
as ‘consumers’ rather than as ‘shapers and makers’ of social interventions. In terms of its design,
the LEAP envisaged a strong citizen engagement with programme implementers, as community
implementation committees were required to identify the most vulnerable households for effective
targeting, as well as help compile complaints and appeals for redress. 
In practice, however, a combination of factors continue to undermine the effectiveness of both
invited and created spaces in Ghana, with apparent adverse implications for the exercise of active
citizenship among LEAP beneficiaries and the wider citizenry. In particular, the prevalence and
deepening of patron-client relations in Ghana along with significant weaknesses in decentralized
governance structures has meant that notions of rights and citizenship remain poorly embedded in
Ghanaian political culture. Not surprisingly, even as policy makers continue to hail LEAP as a
rights-based social intervention programme, beneficiaries have no knowledge about how the LEAP
grant is determined, and a significant number of them do not have adequate information about
their cash grant entitlements. This represents one of the major limitations to LEAP as justice-based
social protection intervention.
19 See The Chronicle, July 12, 2012, ‘LEAP gets donor support’. http://thechronicle.com.gh/leap-gets-donor-support/.
IWP-14 – Social Protection and active citizenship.qxp_Layout 1  06/10/17  19:22  Pagina 38
39
LINKING SOCIAL RIGHTS TO ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP FOR THE MOST VULNERABLE 
Innocenti Working Paper 2017-14
6. CONCLUSIONS: WHAT DOES A CITIZEN-PERSPECTIVE CONTRIBUTE TO SOCIAL
PROTECTION?
Social protection has seen an enormous growth in low and middle income countries over the last
15 years. However, the large proportion of programmes remain income-focused and compensatory.
Many beneficiaries continue to view participation as a gift, without realizing that social protection
should be a right, which can be demanded from government. We have argued here that social
protection should be conceived as a citizenship right, grounded in a social justice based share of
national resources. This enables citizens to claim provisions as their right and demand accountability
from the State. Not only can social protection strengthen this social contract and encourage active
citizenship, but, by its very nature and purpose, it can reach those who are most often excluded
from civic engagement and marginalized. In other words, economic inclusion alone is a too limited
goal of social protection. Objectives to achieve political and social inclusion in the form of active
citizenship should be just as prominent.
Legislative and policy frameworks, such as constitutions and social protection strategies, help to
firmly ground social protection in rights-based institutions. However, it is necessary that citizens
are aware of their rights and are involved in the design of such frameworks in order for new
modalities of citizenship to emerge. Such forms of active citizenship, especially in the form of
‘shapers and makers’, provides a pathway towards improved delivery of justice-based social
protection. These frameworks may be pushed or facilitated through donors and other
intermediaries. However it is important that such involvement does not compromise the interface
between State and citizen. 
The realization of justice-based social protection can be spurred by different catalysts in addition
to active citizenship. For example, donor funded support can help establish the institutional set up,
or a strong civil society, or activism that can help mobilize citizens to make a stand against the
State and claim their rights; or accountability mechanisms in existing programmes such as
grievance mechanisms or social audits. 
As many social protection programmes begin as small-scale pilots, the transformation from pilot to
scaled-up programme provides ample opportunity to shift the balance from beneficiaries as merely
‘consumers’ to ‘shapers and makers’. This transition requires the creation of invited spaces and
allowing claimed spaces for citizens to participate in decision-making and voice concerns.
In addition, citizens need to be made aware of their rights to social protection through effective
communication channels, thereby building citizens’ agency.
The India case shows us that laws and policies are an important step to provide a framework for
citizen rights and entitlements. However, the realization of these rights requires sustained political
commitment at all levels, and the ability for citizens to claim and hold duty-bearers accountable for
these rights. The experience in Brazil demonstrates a road from constitutional reform, through the
support of champions in the federal government and local activism, towards holding the State
accountable for its social responsibilities. In Ghana, notions of citizenship and rights are generally not
well embedded in the political culture. As a consequence, we find that demand-side accountability
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mechanisms, in the form of beneficiary demand for and feedback on the implementation of social
protection programmes faces challenges that are hindering the transformation to a justice-based
system. Nevertheless, nascent social accountability systems are in place and with the express
intention of donors and government it is possible for these to develop into spaces where the State
and citizens will be able to hold each other to account. While all three cases have attracted criticism,
and are by no means perfect programmes, the history of both programmes illustrates promising
avenues for building justice-based social protection and active citizenship.
A citizens’ perspective on social protection encourages us to investigate and understand the
conditions by which social programmes will be sensitive to citizens’ needs and sustainable in the
long-term. It encourages us to consider key questions and synergies between citizens and social
protection frameworks: how resource distribution should be designed and implemented, who is
entitled to resources, and how citizens can become enabled to hold the State accountable.
The case studies show that active citizen involvement as well as the potential latent involvement
(that is, the threat of protests and unrest should the programme be withdrawn) is as important for
the long-term embedding of the programme as is State commitment, through legislation and the
building of appropriate institutions.
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